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PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
Toward ethical sustainability in healthcare and research
Fernando Lolas*
Abstract: This paper puts forward the notion of ethical sustainability as the manifestation of moral values in public
health policy. The most relevant of these values is that of justice, which is interpreted as fairness and qualified according
to the type of society: Gemeinschaft, where social relations are ends in themselves, and Gesellschaft, where social
relations are means to individual ends. Bioethics, as the dialogical construction of the moral universe and the support of
moral imagination, is depicted both as a discourse and as a tool for improving the commonwealth.
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SALUD PÚBLICA Y JUSTICIA SOCIAL
Hacia una sustentabilidad ética en atención de salud e investigación
Resumen: Este artículo desarrolla la noción de sustentabilidad ética como manifestación de valores morales en las
políticas de salud pública. El más relevante de tales valores es el de la justicia, interpretada como equidad y cualificada
según el tipo de sociedad: Gemeinschaft, en la cual las relaciones sociales son fines en sí mismos, y Gesellschaft, en la
cual las relaciones sociales son medios para fines individuales. La bioética, como construcción dialógica del universo
moral y sustento de la imaginación moral, se presenta como discurso y como una herramienta para mejorar el bien
común.
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SAÚDE PÚBLICA E JUSTIÇA SOCIAL
Para a sustentabilidade ética no cuidado à saúde e na pesquisa
Resumo: Este artigo desenvolve a noção de sustentabilidade ética como manifestação de valores morais nas políticas
de saúde pública. O mais relevante de tais valores é o da justiça, interpretada como equidade e qualificada segundo o
tipo de sociedade. Gemeinschaft, em que as relações sociais são fins em si mesmos, e Gesellschaft, em que as relações
sociais são meios para afins individuais. A bioética, como construção dialógica do universo moral e sustento da imaginação
moral, apresenta-se tanto como discurso, bem como uma ferramenta para melhorar o bem comum.
Palavras chave: Bioética, saúde pública, justiça social, sustentabilidade ética
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Health as a multilayered construct
A basic source of ethical conflict and ten-
sion exists between individual needs or de-
sires and the public good. Theories about pri-
orities and ways of resolving this conflict are
central to any discussion on health and
healthcare.
Political liberals tend to promote a rights
model of health care. According to this model,
there is an individual right to health and a cor-
responding right to equal access to health care.
Communitarians tend to view sickness and
death as shared threats to human life, a basic
condition of human existence requiring a shared
response. Solidarity as a basic value is treated
differently in the context of these two theoreti-
cal positions. In the first, it is a convenience
calculation (“every good egoist is an altruist”),
in the second it constitutes a precondition for
collective life (“the good of society is superior
to the good of individuals”).
Health is typically a “layered”, complex,
construct. At the microlevel, that is, at the level
of biochemical and physiological processes
“within” biological organisms, it is difficult
to define, with no meaning distinct from sta-
tistical normalcy, and susceptible of interven-
tion for correcting values which fall outside a
normal range. At the macrolevel, health is the
aggregate of societal effects that promote or
maintain well-being of individuals but at the
same time promote, enhance or improve so-
cial capital, the web of creative relations be-
tween people. It is at the intermediate level,
the level of individual health, where medical
action, death and suffering take place. The
level of the person is endowed with meaning
and constitutes the privileged locus of moral
action. Medicine has been concerned mostly
with this intermediate level at the risk of ne-
glecting the “common space” of societal
health. At some point in the history of the
health sciences, and influenced by the nascent
disciplines of the social sciences, some authors
spoke about “sick societies”(1). This soon
proved to be a metaphorical way of referring
to states of distress of individuals in groups.
Society, as such, cannot become ill in the sense
that an organism gets ill, unless the metaphor
equating society with the body is pushed too
far, as Rudolph Virchow did when he com-
pared medicine to politics and cells to indi-
vidual human beings.
That health cannot be defined below the
level of the individual organism and is diffi-
cult to ascertain at the societal level supports
the contention that equating health with good
occurs only at the human level. It is, in fact,
an evaluative act, not a neutral or natural de-
termination. In 1941, Henri Sigerist wrote that
“a healthy individual is a man who is well bal-
anced bodily and mentally, and well adjusted
to his physical and social environment...
Health, therefore, is not simply the absence
of disease; it is something positive, a joyful
attitude towards life, and a cheerful acceptance
of the responsibilities that life puts upon the
individual”(2). Undoubtedly, this position in-
fluenced the definition adopted by the First
World Assembly of WHO and the drafters of
that definition stated that health is “a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-be-
ing and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity”(3,4). Good is no natural category,
however, in the sense that molecules or cells
are, and evaluative acts can be performed on
an indefinite number of life domains, such as
the spiritual, which can also be considered part
of the definition of health. Thus, individual
health as a value is more an ideal (or “virtue”,
areté, excellence) to aspire to, rather than a
description of a state or a factual determina-
tion. More a quality of life than a scientific
object of study, health has become difficult to
measure and indicators are difficult to develop.
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Bioethics and public health
This difficulty in definition and
operationalization of the health construct is
evident in the field of public health. Its disci-
plinary independency started with descriptive
sciences, such as epidemiology, whose task
soon was expanded to providing help in deci-
sion-making processes and as a useful device
for making recommendations on how to im-
prove people’s lives. It also became apparent
that quality of life, a more inclusive concept
than health itself and scientifically more neu-
tral, could be related either to individual health
aspects or to the contexts (physical, social and
symbolic) in which persons live. Public health
may be said to reflect this contextual aspects
of health and the realm of interventions at the
macro level. As an interventional strategy, pub-
lic health refers to those activities performed
by the organized social body to attain and main-
tain the culturally appropriate level of function-
ing of its members and of the group.
Bioethics in the sphere of public health ex-
pands the dialogical participation of moral ac-
tors to the health consequences of interventions
at the contextual level, that is the web of rela-
tions and interactions between human bodies, be
they physical or abstract and symbolic. Whereas
autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence are
principles with evident application at the inter-
mediate level of the health construct (the level
of individual persons), justice is undoubtedly the
principle most relevant to planning and interven-
tion at the macro, societal or public level.
The Kantian categorical imperative implies
that the maxim by which a person directs his/
her life should be generalizable to society as a
whole. In this sense, a just action is an action
which assures continuity and wellness of soci-
ety and not only of a few members in it. It is a
prospective value, its existence provides the
foundation for social life.
As the discussion below shows, there is both
a formal and a material aspect to justice and
there exist many forms in which the principle
or value is expressed in societies. Goal-based,
duty-based and rights-based considerations for
the fulfillment of this value or principle are
useful for devising (or “inventing”) those rules
which will lend presence to justice in human
affairs, modulated by cultural imprint and tra-
ditions. In any context, it may be observed that
individual moral agents reach a reflective equi-
librium between their own personal experiences
(cases of consciousness), the principles explic-
itly supported by people and those mores, tra-
ditions and customs which implicitly modulate
moral action.
It may be said that the principles of au-
tonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and jus-
tice, among others, can be discerned in all
known societies. The precise architecture of
their relations is, nevertheless, different in dif-
ferent societies. This is similar to the principle
of isomerism in chemistry, where compounds
which are similar in general formulae may be
different in structure.
Justice and society
Justice is a property of social systems, in
much the same way as truth is a property of
systems of thought (Rawls). The definition of
group and social system is not, however, a
simple one.
It has proven useful to distinguish, with the
sociologist Tönnies, between Gemeinshaft and
Gesellschaft. The first is based on face-to-face
contacts and comprises small groups. The es-
sential aspect is that social relations between
persons are ends in themselves. In the second
type of social organization, typical of larger
societies with differentiation by work and
classes of individuals, human relations are
mostly means to accomplish personal or social
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goals. It might be said that Gemeinschaft is a
group geared towards human relations and
Gesellschaft is a group oriented towards im-
personal social tasks. This type of society, char-
acteristic of Western industrialized nations, was
made responsible for alienation and other so-
cial ills and concentrated the criticism from the
social reformers who founded the discourse of
the social sciences in the XIXth and XXth cen-
tury.
Justice is a property of both types of social
systems. Justice may be said to imply the fair
distribution of good in society. The type of jus-
tice most appropriate for Gemeinschaft is com-
mutative or retributive justice, the essence of
which is the exact retribution of what is given.
Primitive forms of legal systems indicate that
penalties are proportional to, if not equal to,
offences. Contracts are based on trust and re-
ciprocal agreement in exact proportion of what
is exchanged. Common morality, or morality
in the narrow sense, is closely associated with
custom and tradition.
The form of justice most appropriate for
Gesellschaft is distributive justice. The com-
mutative form does not disappear. It finds ex-
pression in many different areas, such as penal
and contractual law. In healthcare the question
is how can society provide equal opportunities
to its members and how fair the distribution of
social goods can be. Health as such cannot be
reduced to a commodity that can be sold, bought
or exchanged, but healthcare and its associated
services are subject to market principles as any
other service.
Health, as rightly pointed out by many, is a
personal construction not reducible to medical
interventions, and depends on social, personal,
spiritual and economic factors. In this regard,
it is useful to remember that development and
maintenance of healthcare systems require ac-
knowledging a “clash of rationalities”. A ratio-
nality is a set of principles for administering
and expanding a technology (technologies like
the productive ones, the semiotic ones, power
technologies and technologies of the self are
part of the operation of healthcare systems) and
it exhibits a tendency to monopolize the whole
system of thought (technocratic turn of mod-
ern societies). Economic rationality, for in-
stance, is based on the notion of scarcity and
aims at maximizing efficiency and efficacy in
the use of resources. Therapeutic rationality, on
the other hand, is oriented towards alleviating
or ameliorating deficits. Scientific rationality
is aimed at renovating disciplines and produc-
ing generalizable knowledge.
The technocratic turn of modern societies
has led to a unilateral development of privileged
forms of rationality which become monopoles.
The notion of sustainability, for instance, is as-
sociated mostly with economic rationality.
However, there are also other forms of
sustainability, each associated with a different
rationality. We tend to speak of “ethical
sustainability” to refer to a form of social be-
havior appropriate for the challenges of moral
wisdom.
In relation to healthcare and justice, irrespec-
tive of the form this principle adopts in a par-
ticular society (it is always a formal, not a ma-
terial principle, and has to be filled with con-
tent in a given tradition), the larger the society
the greater the need for “moral imagination”
from its members. Moral imagination, in large
and impersonal societies, replaces face-to-face
contacts and immediate consequences of ac-
tions with anticipation of effects and empathic
understanding of the motives people have for
behaving the way they do. Moral imagination
is also the ability for inventing moral rules,
which constitute the “practical translation” of
values and principles into everyday practice.
Values and principles are universals of mean-
ing, practical rules are concrete instances.
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Towards bioethical sustainability
Daniel Callahan has forcefully put forward
the notion of a sustainable medicine(5). The
idea of sustainability is borrowed from the eco-
nomic sciences and implies the renovation and
affordability of decisions in the future. His re-
flections deal with the requisites the social in-
stitution of medicine should have for being able
to meet the goals society ascribes to it. He sug-
gests that indefinite progress, unending tech-
nological innovation, and the perpetual search
for perfection militate against universal cover-
age, equity of access, and affordability. Even
in economic terms, his analysis seems –or may
be interpreted as– conflicting with the main
trends of Western medicine. We need, Callahan
says, a steady-state medicine, a sustainable so-
cial practice that perhaps will not be the best
possible in technological terms but will be at-
tainable, reasonable, and affordable. His is a
plea for sobriety and self restraint. He empha-
sizes the fact that technology-driven medicine
has been obsessed with means and that a fresh
look at this institution should examine its goals.
In a groundbreaking project entitled precisely
“The goals of medicine”, a number of scholars
from different countries examined what the
perennial goals of social practices may be and
how badly needed a reflection on them was in
times of reform. From that analysis, several
propositions can be formulated for the future
of healthcare and several suggestions for fur-
ther research at the interface between philo-
sophical analysis and empirical social research.
Ethical sustainability as a concept is deeply
rooted in a profound consideration of justice in
all its forms. The challenge ahead lies in recap-
turing those positive aspects of small societies
(Gemeinschaft) in a reformulated Gesellschaft
that has learnt to appreciate that progress with-
out humanity is no progress at all. It may ap-
pear as a truism but experience shows that so-
cial systems built around technology and its
mores tend to free themselves from external
restraints and become autonomous. The prob-
lems they create are of a kind which technol-
ogy itself cannot address, even less solve.
The reason why we should explore the rela-
tion between technology and health is that tech-
nology is one of the forces behind contempo-
rary political power, the market, and the idea
of indefinite progress. Up to now, the techno-
logical divide (in its form of digital divide, or
of economic prosperity) is clearly a factor in
the increasing inequity of access to life oppor-
tunities and to healthcare which plagues Latin
American countries and other regions of the
world. The more money is invested in high tech
medicine, the deeper the difference between the
“have” and the “have not”, the more evident
the spiraling of injustice which, in naive hands,
may lead to antiscience or antitechnology
movements. Globalization has come to mean
power of those who possess technoscience and,
along with respect, it commands distrust and
antagonism.
A technology-driven progress is not in itself
dangerous or even negative. It is the uses of tech-
nology which should be viewed against a deep
reflection on justice and equity. Goal-based con-
siderations may suggest that we should not stop
research and science, for some day their ben-
efits will be accessible to all. This has not proved
to be true up to now. Duty-based considerations
imply that those who have should share with
those who do not have. Every good egoist, the
saying goes, should be an altruist. However, blind
quest for profit may obliterate any good use of
technology based on duty considerations. And
finally, rights-based considerations, although
appealing to those who try to defend them, are
usually less compelling for rights than “centrip-
etal factors” are. They are located in persons but
do not emanate from persons, since they have to
be recognized by others to be fully effective.
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Duties, on the contrary, radiate from the person
and are his/her sole responsibility. An unfulfilled
duty engenders guilt. A right not respected pro-
duces anger and shame. As the historical record
shows, only by the force of law and convention
can rights be ascertained and made respectable.
Violations of human rights occur everywhere and
at all times. This implies that rights need a two-
tied system, their presence and the “good will”
to respect them, whereas an accepted duty is a
force in itself for the person who recognizes it
as personal.
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